Imperfect Information and the Reserve Price Dynamics In Auctions by Olimov, Jafar
Imperfect Information and the Reserve Price Dynamics In Auctions 
Jafar Olimov 
Department of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics  
Ohio State University, 2120 Fyffe Road, Columbus, OH 43210 











Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2011 
 AAEA & NAREA Joint Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, July 24-26, 2011.  
 
Copyright 2011 by Jafar Olimov. All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means,  
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   




























Table 3. Dynamics in Sale Prices 
Imperfect Information and the Reserve Price Dynamics In Auctions 
 
Jafar Olimov, Dept. of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics 
 
 
I study a hybrid bargaining model with an English auction in each state. The seller 
uses auctions to extract information about the bidders’ values of the object on sale. 
The bargaining element is introduced to maximize revenue, since the winning bidder 
has to exceed not only the second-highest bid but also the reservation price of the 
seller.  
This model can explain the following empirical facts from Ebay auctions: multiple 
relisting of similar items, the use of secret reserve prices, and the convergence of sale 
prices to buy-it-now prices.  
 
Sequential Auctions without Commitment 
    McAffee and Vincent (1997): Revenue equivalence between sequential auctions with 
publicly observed reserve prices and static auction without publicly observed reserve price 
when the time between sequential auctions goes to zero  
 
     Reserve Prices 
     Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Xu(2010): revenue optimality of publicly 
observed reserve prices in independent private values environment – screening; 
     Milgrom and Weber (1982), Cai, Riley and Ye (2007): revenue optimality of publicly 
observed reserve prices in common value environment – signaling;  
 
    Theoretical conclusions 
Theory predicts no repeated auctions 
Theory predicts no use of secret reserve prices 
     
    Empirical Evidence 
Existence of repeated auctions 
Widespread use of secret reserve prices 
Abstract 
Motivation 
Data and Methods 
Empirical Evidence 
The dataset of  English auctions on tractors sold on Ebay between 11/17/04 and 5/30/07. 
The total number of observations is 39441. 
 
Theoretical Approach 
Rubinstein bargaining model with incomplete information. Bargaining model with one-
sided incomplete information: Rubinstein (1985) with an overview of the literature in 
Kennan and Wilson (1993). Bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information: 
Cramton (1992) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007).   
 
 
Empirical Evidence from Ebay dataset 
 
•The bargaining model with incomplete information allows 
to introduce delays and multiple relistings 
•Secret reserve prices are justified, since they are used to 
elicit information  
•Convergence of sale prices to BINs can be explained by 
the seller’s use of auctions to acquire information  
•The use of BINs in later stages is justified by informed 
sellers  
•Sellers use auctions to elicit information instead of selling 
– explains the low probability of sales in repeated 
auctions  
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Table 1. 
Tractors  Number of 
tractors 
number of sold 
tractors  
% of sold 
tractors 
1 listing  23253  13251  56.99 
2 listings  4031  1448  35.92 
3 listings  1069  344  32.19 
4 listings  404  117  28.96 
5 listings  197  60  30.46 
6 listings  102  30  29.41 
7 listings  61  20  32.79 
Table 1. 
Tractors with one listing  number of listings 
Percent of 
listings 
Total number of listings  23253  100.00 
listings with reserve prices  10705  46.04 
listings with first bids >100  15573  66.97 
listings with both reserve prices 












as % of BIN 
stde of sale 
price of% of BIN 
1 listing  2556  19.29  90.57  20.40 
2 listings  539  37.22  93.52  11.52 
3 listings  134  38.95  95.41  7.46 
4 listings  55  47.01  95.01  7.83 
5 listings  23  38.33  96.22  6.56 
6 listings  13  43.33  97.49  4.51 
7 listings  9  45.00  96.99  3.68 